Mr. Speaker, we

should support the Lee amendment by

giving unfettered, unconditional support

for U.N. inspections for disarmament.

Our government has a history of undermining

the United Nations and has

been particularly bad regarding Iraq.

In 1990, we bribed and threatened and

punished the Security Council to force

a vote endorsing our war. We bribed

poor countries with cheap Saudi oil.

We bribed China with diplomatic rehabilitation

and new development aid.

And we told Yemen, the only Arab

country on the Council, that its vote

against our war would be ‘‘the most expensive

vote you ever cast.’’ And then

we punished Yemen, the poorest country

in the Arab world, with a cutoff of

our entire $70 million aid package.

As we try to impose our war again on

a reluctant United Nations, I fear that

the Yemen precedent is being recalled

at the U.N. today. I hope that our

friends and our allies who might be

considering a different approach in the

U.N. will not be intimidated by our

unilateral abuse of this multilateral

institution.

The President can always call us

back, if he is ready. He says he is not

ready. He says war is not imminent. So

why are we giving him such an order?

Mr. Speaker, I include for the

RECORD an article from The Guardian

entitled ‘‘The U.S. Has Been Seeking to

Prevent a Resolution of the Iraq Crisis

for the Past 8 Years.’’

Mr. Speaker, we are

standing at the abyss of a horrifying war.

President Bush himself told us Monday night

that this war was neither ‘‘imminent nor unavoidable.’’

And yet we are pushing, hurrying,

racing against time to give the President our

approval of a future war, a war without limits

or boundaries, a war waged because the

President thinks diplomacy has failed.

I do not believe diplomacy has failed. And I

do not believe we have to go to war. President

Bush’s speech was designed to frighten the

American people, and to intimidate the United

Nations. It wasn’t address to us, the Congress,

because President Bush and his advisers

already believe that they have our backing.

But they don’t have the backing of the

American people. The pools tell us that. Our

constituents tell us that. The phone calls and

faxes and emails and letters to our offices,

running 100 to one, 500 to one against this

war, all tell us that. I, for one, am not afraid.

And I do not think my colleagues in the House

and in the Senate should be afraid either. We

should not be afraid of standing up to an unnecessary

war. We should not be afraid to

stand up to a President when he is wrong. We

should not be afraid of the American people;

they are right.

President Bush tells us how important it is,

for his campaign to win support in the United

Nations, that we here in the United States

speak with one voice. But we do not have only

one voice; we cannot and will not lend our

voices to support a war that we know is

wrong. When my colleagues and I went to

Iraq, we went to tell the Iraqis that they must

allow free and unfettered U.N. inspections. We

went to investigate the situation facing Iraqi civilians

after 12 years of crippling economic

sanctions. And we went knowing that our democracy

is strengthened when we see, and

hear, and learn and debate all sides. We

didn’t have to go to Iraq to know why we’re

against going to war against Iraq. There are

plenty of reasons back home to oppose this

juggernaut towards a unilateral preemptive

strike on Iraq.

The first reason is that disarmament should

be on top of our Iraq agenda. And getting the

United Nations inspectors back in should be

the first step towards accomplishing that task.

The U.N. must be allowed to take the lead;

their inspectors were already close to finishing

work on the technical arrangements so they

could get to work right away. Iraq had proposed

the inspection team arrive as early as

October 16th.

Initial meetings between Iraqi and U.N. officials

were held in March of this year to begin

discussions about the return of inspectors to

Iraq after they had been excluded for almost

four years. Further meetings were held in May

and again on the 4th of July. That July meeting

was particularly useful, coming in the context

of growing international pressure on Iraq

and seeming to set the stage for the serious

possibility of inspectors returning to Baghdad.

But the next day, July 5th, the Pentagon

leaked its latest provocative war plan to the

New York Times, calling for a major air attack

and land invasion to ‘‘topple Saddam Hussein.’’

The Iraqis pulled back.

But pressure continued to build, and in August

the Iraqi Parliament invited members of

Congress to come to Baghdad with inspectors

of our choosing and to look for ourselves. On

September 13th I went to New York to meet

with Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, and told

him I would accept his invitation to Iraq with

the understanding that the inspectors I would

choose to accompany me would be the

UNMOVIC inspectors themselves. We talked

about the absolute necessity of the U.N. resuming

unfettered inspections in Iraq, and he

said they were ready for such inspections, and

they understood that if no weapons were

found the Security Council would lift the economic

sanctions. I made no promises except

to say I would come. Forty-eight hours later,

on September 16, Sabri told Kofi Annan that

Iraq was prepared to accept the inspectors

back into Iraq.

Unfortunately, instead of welcoming this development,

it became clear that the Bush administration

was not prepared to take Iraq’s

‘‘yes’’ for an answer. The State Department’s

answer to the long-delayed Iraqi acquiescence

was to announce that it was now in ‘‘thwart

mode,’’ determined to prevent the inspections

from going forward.

There has been no solid information regarding

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction since

UNSCOM and IAEA arms inspectors left Iraq

in December 1998 in advance of the U.S.

Desert Fox bombing operation. Prior to leaving,

the last report (November 1998) of the

UNSCOM chief Richard Butler stated explicitly

that although they had been hindered by Iraqi

non-compliance in carrying out a small number

of inspections, ‘‘the majority of the inspections

of facilities and sites under the ongoing

monitoring system were carried out with Iraq’s

cooperation.’’ the IAEA report was unequivocal

that Iraq no longer had a viable nuclear program.

The UNSCOM report was less definitive,

but months earlier, in March 1998,

UNSCOM Chief Richard Butler said that his

team was satisfied there was no longer any

nuclear or long-range missile capability in Iraq,

and that UNSCOM was ‘‘very close’’ to completing

the chemical and biological phases.

Since that time, there have been no

verifiable report regarding Iraq’s WMD programs.

It is important to get inspectors back

into Iraq, but U.S. threats for years made that

virtually impossible by setting a ‘‘negative incentive’’

in place. This pattern has been underway

for years. It began when then-Secretary

of State Warren Christopher announced

in April 1994 that the U.S. was no longer

bound by the U.N. resolution’s language promising

an end to sanctions when disarmament

of Iraq’s WMD programs was complete. Similarly,

in 1997 Christopher’s successor, Madeleine

Albright, affirmed that economic sanctions

would remain as long as Saddam Hussein

was in power—regardless of the U.N. position

linking sanctions only to the WMD programs.

So Baghdad was told that sanctions

would remain regardless of Iraqi compliance

with U.N. disarmament requirements. Similarly,

the U.S. message today is that a U.S.

military strike will likely take place regardless

of Iraq’s compliance with U.N. resolutions regarding

inspections, so they have no reason

to implement their own obligations. If the

United States refuses to abide by the requirements

of U.N. resolutions and the rule of international

law, why are we surprised when an

embattled and tyrannical government does the

same thing?

Inspections remain vitally important.

Throughout the 1980s the U.S. sent to Baghdad

a lethal assortment of high-quality germ

seed stock for anthrax, botulism, E. coli, and

a host of other deadly diseases. It is certainly

possible that scraps of Iraq’s earlier biological

and chemical weapons programs remain in

existence, but their shelf life is likely only three

or four years. More significantly, since it is

also possible (though we have see no evidence)

that Iraq has manufactured additional

chemical or biological weapons material, Iraq

has no delivery system capable of using them

against the U.S. or U.S. allies. The notion that

the U.S. must go to war against Iraq because

of the existence of tiny amounts of biological

material, insufficient for use in missiles or

other strategic weapons and which the U.S.

itself provided during the years of the U.S.-

Iraq alliance in the 1980s, is simply unacceptable.

Regarding the nuclear level threat, the IAEA

confirmed in 1998 that Iraq had no viable nuclear

weapons program. Despite constant allegations,

we still have seen no clear evidence

that Iraq is anywhere close to being able to

manufacture a nuclear weapon. The breathless

claim that ‘‘if it obtained sufficient missile

material and massive external assistance’’ Iraq

could manufacture a nuclear weapon in one

year is simply spurious. The same statement

could be said for Cameroon or Vanuatu—

that’s why we have military sanctions and

that’s why we ought to hold the Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) and other disarmament treaties

in much higher regard.

Pretty much the whole world believes that

inspections and disarmament should be our

goal—not the overthrow of the government in

Iraq. The Bush administration knows it is isolated

in the world on this issue: to say that the

U.S. goal is regime overthrow, rather than disarmament

would violate the UN Charter.

The second reason we should oppose this

war has to do with its impact on our relations

with allies all over the world. There is virtually

no international support, at the governmental

or public level, for a U.S. attack on Iraq. Our

closest allies throughout Europe, in Canada,

and elsewhere, have made clear their opposition

to a military invasion. While they recognize

the Iraqi regime as a brutal, undemocratic

regime, they do not support a unilateral preemptive

military assault as an appropriate response

to that regime. Our European friends

are pleading with us not to go to war, reminding

us that disarmament, starting with inspections,

is their goal. Russia and China say the

same thing. Are we to simply ignore our

friends’ opinions and go it alone?

Throughout the Middle East, the Arab

states, including our closest allies, have made

unequivocal their opposition to an invasion of

Iraq. Even Kuwait, once the target of Iraqi military

occupation and ostensibly the most vulnerable

to Iraqi threats, has moved to normalize

its relations with Baghdad. The Arab

League-sponsored rapprochement between

Iraq and Kuwait at the March 2002 Arab Summit

is now underway, including such long overdue

moves as the return of Kuwait’s national

archives. Iraq has now repaired its relation

with every Arab country, and not a single

one of Iraq’s neighbors publicly supports a

U.S. war. Turkey has refused to publicly announce

its agreement to allow use of its air

bases, and Jordan and other Arab countries

have made clear their urgent plea for the U.S.

to abjure a military attack on Iraq.

Again, it is certain unlikely that a single government

in the region would ultimately stand

against a U.S. demand for base rights, use of

airspace or overflight rights, or access to any

other facilities. The question we must answer

therefore is not whether our allies will ultimately

accede to our wishes, but just how

high a price are we prepared to exact from our

allies? Virtually every Arab government, especially

those most closely tied to the U.S. (Jordan

and Egypt, perhaps even Saudi Arabia)

will face dramatically escalated popular opposition.

The existing crisis of legitimacy faced

by these non-representative regimes, absolute

monarchies and president-for-life style

democratics, will be seriously exacerbated by

a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Region-wide instability

may be expected to result, and some of those

governments might even face the possibility of

being overthrown.

In the entire Middle East region, only Israel

supports the U.S. build-up to war in Iraq.

Prime Minister Sharon has made no secret of

his view that the chaos caused by a U.S. attack

on Iraq might well provide him with the

opportunity for a large-scale escalation against

the Palestinians.

When President Bush repeats his mantra

that ‘‘you are either with us or with the terrorists,’’

no government in the world wants to

stand defiant. But a foreign policy based on

international coercion and our allies’ fear of retaliation

for noncompliance, is not a policy that

will protect Americans and our place in the

world.

Still another reason to oppose this has to do

with the human toll. During the Vietnam war,

I was lieutenant commander in the U.S. Navy

Medical Corps. My job, as a psychiatrist, was

to treat young soldiers who returned from that

war terribly damaged by what they saw and

what they suffered. I carry those memories

with me still.

While official estimates of casualties among

U.S. service personnel are not public, we can

be certain they will be much higher than in the

current war in Afghanistan. We do know, from

Pentagon estimates of two years ago, the likely

death toll among Iraqi civilians: about

10,000 Iraqi civilians would be killed.

The most recent leaked military plan for invading

Iraq, the so-called ‘‘inside-out’’ plan

based on a relatively small contingent of U.S.

ground troops with heavy reliance on air

strikes, would focus first and primarily on

Baghdad. In fact, all of the leaked military

plans begin with air assaults on Baghdad. The

Iraqi capital is described as being ringed with

Saddam Hussein’s crack troops and studded

with anti-aircraft batteries. Those charges may

or may not be true. But what is never mentioned

in the military planning documents is

the inconvenient fact that Baghdad is also a

crowded city of five million or more people; a

heavy air bombardment would cause the

equivalent human catastrophe of—and look

very similar to—a heavy air bombardment of

Los Angeles.

And it is here that my trip to Iraq taught me

a great deal. It reminded me again of the

costs of war. I remembered again what Iraqis

would suffer with this war. My colleagues and

I visited hospitals, where we saw young cancer

patients dying before their mothers eyes

from lack of chemotherapy drugs.

Further, the destruction of civilian infrastructure

such as water, electrical and communications

equipment, would lead to tens, perhaps

hundreds of thousands of more civilian deaths,

particularly among children, the aged and others

of the most vulnerable sectors. We can

anticipate that such targeted attacks would be

justified by claims of ‘‘dual use.’’ But if we look

back to the last U.S. war with Iraq, we know

that the Pentagon planned and carried out

studies ahead of time, documenting the likely

impact on civilians of specific attacks. In one

case, Pentagon planners anticipated that striking

Iraq’s civilian infrastructure would cause

The

Defense Intelligence Agency’s document

(posted on the Pentagon’s Gulflink website), is

titled ‘‘Disease Information—Subject: Effects of

Bombing on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad’’

and is dated 22 January 1991, just six days

after the war began. It itemized the likely outbreaks

of diseases to include: ‘‘acute diarrhea’’

brought on by bacteria such as E. coli,

shigella, and salmonella, or by protozao such

as giardia, which will affect ‘‘particularly children,’’

or by rotavirus, which will also affect

‘‘particularly children.’’ And despite this advance

knowledge, the bombing of the water

treatment systems proceeded, and indeed, according

to UNICEF figures, hundreds of thousands

of Iraqis, ‘‘particularly children,’’ died

from the effects of dirty water. Just as predicted.

I traveled with my colleagues to the southern

city of Basra, where we heard from physicians

that the first question new mothers ask

after giving birth is not whether the baby is a

boy or a girl, but whether it is normal or not—

because the rates of birth defects are so high.

Many think those high rates of birth defects,

skyrocketing rates of leukemia and other cancers,

have something to do with the depleted

uranium weapons our military used so efficiently

during the war 12 years ago.

Many of our own Gulf War veterans—and

their children—are also suffering higher than

normal rates of cancers and birth defects. And

the Veterans Administration medical care

budget has just been slashed. Do we want to

go to war again, a war that will cost perhaps

$60 to $100 billion, and create a whole new

generation of wounded veterans, along with

too many who will not come home at all? We

have not yet heard an answer from the Pentagon

to the question of how they plan to protect

our men and women in uniform—as well

as vulnerable Iraqi civilians—from the danger

of depleted uranium weapons. So far the Pentagon

has still not conducted the full-scale scientific

study of the impact of DU on the human

body. We should not go to war to use our

troops as guinea pigs again.

I oppose this war because it is a war of empire,

not of legitimate self-defense. We claim

to be a nation of laws. But too often we are

prepared to put aside the requirements of

international law and the United Nations Charter

to which we hold other nations appropriately

accountable.

When it comes to policy on Iraq, the U.S.

has a history of sidelining the central role that

should be played by the United Nations. This

increasingly unilateralist trajectory is one of

the main reasons for the growing international

antagonism towards the U.S. By imposing its

will on the Security Council—insisting on the

continuation of economic sanctions when virtually

every other country wants to lift them,

announcing its intention to ignore the UN in

deciding whether to go to war against Iraq—

the U.S. isolates us from our allies, antagonizes

our friends, and sets our nation apart

from the international systems of laws that

govern the rest of the world. This does not

help, but rather undermines, our long-term security

interests.

International law does not allow for preemptive

military strikes, except in the case of extreme

emergency to prevent an immediate attack.

President Bush himself told us on October

7th that war with Iraq is ‘‘neither imminent

nor unavoidable.’’ Therefore it does not qualify

as self-defense under the UN Charter. We

simply do not have the right—no country

does—to launch a war against another country

that has not attacked us. If the Pentagon had

been able to scramble a jet to take down the

second plane flying into the World Trade Center

last September, that would be a legal us of

preemptive self defense. An attack on Iraq—

which does not have the capacity, and has not

for a decade or more shown any specific intention

or plan or effort to attack the U.S.—

violates international law and the UN Charter.

The Charter, in Article 51, outlines the terms

under which a Member State of the United

Nations may use force in self-defense. That

Article acknowledges a nation’s ‘

The Charter does not allow military

force to be used absent an armed attack having

occurred.

Some administration spokespeople are fond

of a sound bit that says ‘‘the UN Charter is not

a suicide pact.’’ Others like to remind us that

Iraq (and other nations) routinely violate the

Charter. Both statements are true. But the

United States has not been attacked by Iraq,

and no evidence has been brought forward

that Iraq is anywhere close to being able to

carry out such an attack. The U.S. is the

strongest international power—in terms of

global military reach, economic, cultural, diplomatic

and political power—that has ever existed

throughout history. If the United States—

with such massive global power—does not

recognize the UN Charter and international

law as the foundation of global security and

hold ourselves accountable to them, how can

we expect others to do so?

President Bush’s October 7th speech was

clearly designed to frighten the American people.

Once again that speech disingenuously

linked the true horror and legitimate fear of the

September 11th attacks with an implied connection

to Iraq. The events of September 11

must never happen again, the president proclaims,

and we will go to war against Iraq to

make sure that they don’t.

Few of us in the Congress, and too few

journalists and pundits, stood to challenge that

claim, to remind the American people that no

link has been shown between Iraq and the

events of September 11th. That there is a war

against terrorism that has so far failed to find

the perpetrators of those events. That of all

the four thousand or more people killed in Afghanistan,

not one of them was named

Osama bin Laden.

It is now clear that (despite intensive investigative

efforts) there is simply no evidence as

yet of any Iraqi involvement in the terror attacks

of September 11. The most popular theory,

of a Prague-based collaboration between

one of the 9/11 terrorists and an Iraqi official,

has collapsed. On July 17th, the Prague Post

quoted the director general of the Czech foreign

intelligence service UZSI (Office of Foreign

Relations and Information), Frantisek

Bublan, denying the much-touted meeting between

Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers,

and an Iraqi agent. The Czech Republic

simply had no evidence that such a meeting

ever took place, he said.

More significantly, the Iraqi regime’s brutal

treatment of its own population has generally

not extended to international terrorist attacks.

The State Department’s own compilation of

terrorist activity in its 2001 Patterns of Global

Terrorism, released May 2002, does not document

a single serious act of international terrorism

by Iraq. Almost all references are to political

statements.

We are told that we must go to war preemptively

against Iraq because Baghdad might,

some time in the future, succeed in crafting a

dangerous weapon and might, some time in

the future, give that weapon to a terrorist

group—maybe Osama bin Laden—who might,

some time in the future, use that weapon

against the U.S. The problem with this analysis,

aside from the fact that preemptive

strikes are illegal under international law, is

that it ignores the widely known historic antagonism

between Iraq and bin Laden. According

to the New York Times,

Even if bin Laden’s claim to

be able to provide those troops was clearly

false, bin Laden’s hostility towards the ruthlessly

secular Iraq remained evident. There is

no evidence that that has changed.

Ironically, an attack on Iraq would increase

the threat to U.S. citizens throughout the Middle

East and beyond, as another generation of

young Iraqis come to identify Americans only

as the pilots of high-flying jet bombers and as

troops occupying their country. While today

American citizens face no problems from ordinary

people in the streets of Baghdad or elsewhere

in Iraq, as I found during my visit to

Iraq in September 2002, that situation would

likely change in the wake of a U.S. attack on

Iraq. In other countries throughout the Middle

East, already palpable anger directed at U.S.

threats would dramatically escalate and would

provide a new recruiting tool for extremist elements

bent on harm to U.S. interests or U.S.

citizens. It would become far more risky for

U.S. citizens to travel abroad.

Many accusations have been made regarding

the role of oil in this war. What is clear is

that the public statements of some in the private

sector match the undenied whispers of

others, such as administration figures themselves.

those statements include the intention

to render null and void all existing oil exploration

contracts signed between Iraq and various

national oil companies, particularly those

of France and Russia, when the current Iraqi

regime is replaced after a U.S. war. I do not

want to support a war partly designed to redraft

the global oil markets in the interest of

undermining French or Russian oil companies

and privileging our own.

Any of us who are serious about opposing

this war must also be serious about alternatives

to war. We must take seriously the

threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Disarmament must be on top of our agenda.

We must support the weapons inspection

team, not undermining it. We must support the

United Nations, not threatening it with irrelevance

if its member states don’t agree with

our war.

And we should go beyond the existing efforts

to get serious about military sanctions.

Denying Iraq access to weapons is not sufficient,

nor can it be maintained as long as Iraq

is surrounded by some of the most overarmed

states in the world. U.S. weapons shipments

to all countries in the region aggravate

this situation and, as the biggest arms exporter

in the world, the U.S. can change it.

We can expand the application of military

sanctions as defined in UN Resolution 687.

Military sanctions against Iraq should be tightened—

by expanding them to a system of regional

military sanctions, thus lowering the volatility

of this already arms-glutted region. Article

14 of resolution 687—the same resolution

that calls for sanctions, inspections and destruction

of Iraq’s WMD programs—points the

way. It recognizes that the disarmament of

Iraq should be seen as a step towards ‘‘the

goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone

free from weapons of mass destruction and all

missiles for their delivery and the objective of

a global ban on chemical weapons.

We are told we must attack Iraq preemptively

so that it can never obtain nuclear weapons.

While we know from IAEA inspectors that

Iraq’s nuclear program was destroyed by the

end of 1998, we do not know what has developed

since. We do know, however, a few

things. We know that nuclear facilities are of

necessity large, visible to surveillance satellites,

and detectable by a host of telltale

chemical and radiological footprints. Such facilities

cannot be mounted on the back of a

pick-up truck. Our intelligence indicates that

Iraq does not have access to fissile material,

without which any nuclear program is a hollow

shell. And we know where fissile material is.

Protection of all nuclear material, including insuring

continuity of the funding for protection

of Russian nuclear material, must be an ongoing

priority.

We should note that U.S. officials are threatening

a war against Iraq, a country known not

to possess nuclear weapons. Simultaneously,

the administration is continuing appropriate

negotiations with North Korea, which does

have something much closer to nuclear weapons

capacity. Backed by IAEA inspections, the

model of negotiations and inspections is exactly

what the U.S. should be proposing for

Iraq.

And what about ‘‘the day after’’? There is no

democratic opposition ready to take over in

Iraq. Far more likely than the creation of an indigenous,

popularly-supported democratic Iraqi

government, would be the replacement of the

current regime with one virtually indistinguishable

from it except for the man at the top. In

February 2002 Newsweek magazine profiled

the five leaders said to be on Washington’s

short list of candidates to replace Saddam

Hussein. The Administration has not publicly

issued such a list of its own, but it certainly

typifies the model the U.S. has in mind. All

five of the candidates were high-ranking officials

within the Iraqi military until the mid-

1990s. All five have been linked to the use of

chemical weapons by the military; at least one

admits it. The legitimacy of going to war

against a country to replace a brutal military

leader with another brutal leader must be challenged.

And whoever is installed in Baghdad by victorious

U.S. troops, it is certain that a long and

possibly bloody occupation would follow. The

price would be high; Iraqis know better than

we do how their government has systematically

denied them civil and political rights. But

they hold us responsible for stripping them of

their economic and social rights—the right to

sufficient food, clear water, education, medical

care—that together form the other side of the

human rights equation. Economic sanctions

have devastated Iraqi society. After twelve

years those in Washington who believe that

Iraqis accept the popular inside-the-Beltway

mantra that ‘‘sanctions aren’t responsible,

Saddam Hussein is responsible’’ for hunger

and deprivation in Iraq, are engaged in wishful

thinking. The notion that everyone in Iraq will

welcome as ‘‘liberators’’ those whom most

Iraqis hold responsible for 12 years of crippling

sanctions is simply naive. Basing military

strategy on such wishful speculation becomes

very dangerous—in particular for U.S. troops

themselves.

An U.S. invasion of Iraq would risk the lives

of U.S. military personnel and kill potentially

thousands of Iraqi civilians, it is not surprising

that many U.S. military officers, including

some within the Joint Chief’s of Staff, are publicly

opposed to a new war against Iraq. such

an attack would violate international law and

the UN Charter, and isolate us from our

friends and allies around the world. An invasion

would complicate the return of UN arms

inspectors, and will cost billions of dollars urgently

needed at home. And at the end of the

day, an invasion will not insure stability, let

alone democracy, in Iraq or the rest of the

volatile Middle east region. Rather, it will put

American civilians at greater risk than they are

today.

We need disarmament, not a war for empire,

oil, or ‘‘regime change.’’ We need the UN

inspectors to go in and finish their work. Until

they do, we simply don’t know what weapons

Iraq has or doesn’t have.

Let us not go to war, in pursuit of oil or the

blandishments of empire. War is too important

and its consequences too disastrous.